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BRIEF ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Docket No. 930554-CA
vs.
WAYNE PARKER,
Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The jurisdiction of this Court is based upon § 78-2-2(3) (j) and §
78-2-2(4), Utah Code Ann, (1953 as amended)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was it proper for the trial court to impute acquiescence

to a non-resident land owner?
The standard of review in equity cases where the trial court
has made legal conclusions and factual findings is the clearly
erroneous standard.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); Bellon v.

Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991); Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d
1174 (Utah 1989).
2.

Was it proper for the trial court to quiet title to real

property in the Plaintiff on the basis of boundary by acquiescence

1

where the court imputed acquiescence in the boundary to the Hanrath
Defendant's predecessor in interest?
The standard of review in equity cases where the trial court
has made legal conclusions and factual findings is the clearly
erroneous standard. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); Bellon v.
Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991); Bountiful v. Riley. 784 P.2d
1174 (Utah 1989).
3.

Was it proper for the trial court to quiet title to real

property in the Plaintiff on the basis of boundary by acquiescence
where

the

evidence

clearly

established

that

there

was

no

acquiescence to an established and clearly identifiable boundary?
The standard of review in equity cases where the trial court
has made legal conclusions and factual findings is the clearly
erroneous standard. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); Bellon v.
Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991); Bountiful v. Rilev, 784 P.2d
1174 (Utah 1989).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES & RULES
None.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This action was brought by the Plaintiff to quiet title in a

parcel

of

real property

on the
2

legal basis

of

boundary

by

acquiescence.

The parcel of property claimed by the Plaintiff is

included in the legal description of property owned by the Hanrath
Defendant's since August of 1986.

B.

Course of Proceedings
The Verified Complaint was filed in this matter in September,

1989. The Hanrath Defendant's moved for summary judgment in April
1991, on the basis that Plaintiff could not prove the elements
required for establishing a boundary by acquiescence.
Judge Dennis L. Draney denied the Summary judgment in August
of 1991, on the basis that there were "genuine issues of material
fact regarding the occupation of the subject land up to a visible
line marked by natural monuments, fences or buildings."
The matter was tried before the Honorable John R. Anderson
sitting without a jury, on November 19, 1992, and the Court took
the matter under advisement at the conclusion of those proceedings.

C.

Disposition at the trial court
On November 30 ,1992, the court issued its memorandum decision

finding in favor of the Plaintiff and quieting title to the
disputed property in him.

D.

Statement of Facts

Plaintiff claims to be the owner in fee simple of the lands and
premises described below:

3

Beginning at the SOUTHWEST corner of the NORTH 1/2
of the NORTHEAST 1/4 of Section 20, Township 2 SOUTH,
Range 6, WEST, U.S.M., and running thence EAST 2,640 feet
to the EAST line of said Section, thence NORTH 1,320
feet, more or less to the ledges located NORTH of the
Duchesne River, thence WESTERLY along said ledges 2,640
feet, more or less to a point due NORTH of the point of
beginning, thence SOUTH 1,320 feet, more or less, to the
point of beginning, Excepting therefrom that portion
lying within the public road on the SOUTH thereof.
The Hanrath Defendants are the fee simple owners of certain real
property bordering that owned by Plaintiff and more particularly
described as:
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 6 WEST. UINTAH SPECIAL BASE &
MERIDIAN. Section 17: The Southeast Quarter.
EXCEPTING therefrom a 30.0 foot easement for road and
utility purposes. Reserving unto the Grantor all oil,
gas, and mineral rights.
This property includes land on either side of the Duchesne River
and some rocky ledges and cliffs to the north.
The Hanrath Defendants received the property

by way of

Warranty Deed dated August 23, 1986, from Barbara Shrader. (Exhibit
25) Shrader and her husband

(now deceased) owned the subject

property from 1961 to 1986 while they resided in California. (Tr.
163)

The Shraders visited their property only once during that

time, in 1974 or 1975. (Tr. 166)

During that visit Mrs. Shrader

did not observe any evidence that someone else was occupying the
property or any fence lines on the property. (Tr. 167, 184)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Hanraths appeal on the basis that the evidence at trial
did not support the conclusion that there was acquiescence to a
boundary which differed from the legal description of the property.
4

A boundary by acquiescence requires mutual recognition by adjoining
landowners and in this case, the Hanrath's predecessor did not
acquiesce in any boundary.

The Hanraths also allege that there was

no

definitely

visible

line

marked

by

monuments,

fences

or

buildings.
ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFF DID NOT ESTABLISH A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
The Plaintiff had the burden at trial of proving the existence
of a boundary by acquiescence in order to quiet title in his name.
The elements required to prove a boundary by acquiescence are:
1.

occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by
monuments, fences or buildings;

2.

acquiescence in the line as the boundary;

3.

for a long period of time; and

4.

by adjoining landowners.

Staker v. Ainsworth. 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990).

Proof of each of

these elements gives rise only to a presumption of a boundary by
acquiescence.

Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282, 421 P. 2d 944, 946

(1966).
The Hanraths do not dispute the fact that they are adjoining
landowners with the Plaintiff

and that the property has

occupied for a long period of time.

This appeal is focused on the

Plaintiffs failure to prove the first two elements.
claiming

title by acquiescence

been

fails to establish

If a party
any

of the

elements which give rise to a presumption in his favor, then he has

5

not proved his case.

Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d

944, 946 (1966).
The

Plaintiff

alleged

at trial

that

the

community

has

recognized the ledges, cliffs and old established fence line as a
boundary to his property. At trial the Court heard testimony from
several witnesses in support of this position.
The

law however

requires

that the

adjoining

landowners

mutually agree on the boundary in order for there to be a boundary
by acquiescence. Fuoco v. Williams, 421 P.2d at 947. In this case
the evidence adduced at trial from the adjoining landowner, the
predecessor to Hanraths: Mrs. Shrader, clearly did not support a
finding that she acquiesced in Plaintiffs boundary.
a.

The adjoining landowner did not acquiesce.

Barbara Shrader and her husband bought property in 1961 and
held on to it for 25 years in 1974 or 1975 (Tr. 166) . They visited
that property one time during that 25 years.

Mrs. Shrader

testified that at the time of that visit they did not notice that
any one else was occupying the property they owned.

(Tr. 167) She

did not notice any fence lines or signs that the land was being
cultivated. (Tr. 179, 183)
It is clear from her testimony that she believed that their
property extended beyond the river and included property on both
sides of the cliffs and ledges. (Tr. 164, 183)

Judge Anderson

ruled in his Memorandum Decision that "the Shraders had a duty to
visually inspect what there was to be seen.

The Court concludes

that their failure to do so carries imputed acquiescence from their
6

predecessors who could have seen the fences and the total enclosure
to the cliffs North of the river."

(R. 205)

He cites no legal

precedent for his ruling that acquiescence may be imputed or a
finding of acquiescence made when the adjoining landowner does not
have any knowledge of the purported boundary.
understanding

of

the

boundaries

was

based

Ms Shrader,s

upon

the

legal

description and plat map of her property and it is the position of
the Hanrath Defendant's that she was entitled to rely on those
documents alone without a visual inspection.
The Utah courts have used both an objective and subjective
test used to determine the fact of acquiescence.

The objective

test relies on the parties' actions with respect to the boundary to
determine whether there was acquiescence. Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah
2d 119, 505 P.2d 1199 (1973).

In Lane, the adjoining landowners

knew of and recognized the existence of a fence as the boundary for
48 years, even though they knew it was not consistent with the
legal descriptions of the properties. No action was ever taken to
correct the boundary until the property values in that area
skyrocketed.

In affirming the trial court's decision that the

fence did constitute a boundary, the Supreme Court found that
mutual intent is not necessary for acquiescence.

Id. at 1200.

"... the test to establish the boundary by
"acquiescence" necessarily need not be based
on mutual "intent".
"Intent" is not
synonymous with "acquiescence" in these cases.
"Acquiescence" is more nearly synonymous with
"indolence" or "consent by silence," — or a
knowledge that a fence or other monuments
appears to be a boundary, — but that no one
did anything about it for 48 years. Lane, 505
P.2d at 1200 (emphasis added).
7

It is important to note that in Lane both parties resided on
their respective properties, knew of the existence of the fence and
affirmatively treated it as a boundary.
been intent, there was knowledge.

While there may not have

In this case, Mrs. Shrader had

no knowledge that the Plaintiff had erected a fence which he was
treating as the east and west boundary to his property. Likewise,
she had no knowledge that Carter was treating the ledges and cliffs
as the north boundary to his property. There can be no "indolence"
on "consent by silence" without knowledge of the purported, but
different

line.

Without some evidence of her knowledge and

acquiescence, there is no basis to find that there was a boundary
by acquiescence under this objective test.
A subjective test was applied in Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d
1224 (Utah 1974).

In that case, a fence was built to control

cattle without the permission or acquiescence of the neighbor. The
Plaintiffs then sought to quiet title and the Defendant claimed
that the fence constituted a boundary by acquiescence.

The trial

court held in favor of the Defendant finding that the fence had
been in existence for over 2 0 years and the Defendants and their
predecessors had used the property up to the fence during that
period.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed that decision and held that
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence could not be invoked where
there was evidence that demonstrated that the fence was not built
pursuant to an agreement between the adjoining landowners. Wright,
521 P. 2d at 1227. The court rejected the Defendants argument that
8

where the parties passively accept a fence line as a boundary for
the requisite period of time, the parties need not have a necessary
mental intent that the boundary be the fence line. In other words,
passive acceptance of a fence as a boundary will not establish
acquiescence where there is no agreement between the adjoining
landowners.
The present case is much closer factually to the Wright case.
Carter erected his fence and used the land up to the cliffs with
out the permission or knowledge of the adjoining

landowner,

Shrader. There was no evidence introduced at trial that the fence,
which was erected by the Plaintiff for livestock control and
boundary purposes (Tr. 54, 145), was built pursuant to an agreement
between

adjoining

landowners.

"The doctrine of boundary by

acquiescence cannot be invoked in the instant action, since there
was evidence that clearly implied that the fence was not built
pursuant to an agreement between adjoining landowners." Wright, 521
P. 2d at 1227. It is even more evident when the purported "line" is
not a fence but naturally occurring rock cliffs and ledges impart
no notice by themselves.
The Plaintiff cannot establish the requisite element of
acquiescence to the purported boundary under either test.
b. There was additional evidence at trial that contradicts a
finding of boundary by acquiescence.
In the trial of this matter the Court heard testimony from
both Shrader and her realtor, Clayton Wilkerson, that Carter sought
to purchase the property in question from Mrs. Shrader. (Tr. 103,
9

187)

In a recent case on the issue of boundary by acquiescence,

this Court acknowledged that evidence that an adjoining landowner's
attempt to purchase the property in dispute is contrary to a
finding of boundary by acquiescence. VanDvke v. Chappell, 818 P. 2d
1023, 1025 (Utah 1991).
In VanDyke, the Court ruled that the fence which had been
recognized by the adjoining landowners and the community for over
80 years was indeed a boundary by acquiescence. Among the evidence
they relied upon in sustaining the trial court's decision, was that
the Plaintiff had previously attempted to buy the property which
they were now claiming to own.

"There was also evidence that the

Chappells attempted to purchase the property.

This testimony

alone, if the judge believed it, was sufficient to support the
conclusion that the Chappells understood that the property in
question belonged to Van Dyke and the fence line was the boundary."
818 P.2d at 1025.
The present case involves an offer to purchase property,
however it was the Plaintiff who sought to buy that which he now
claims to have owned all along.

Relying on the rationale in Van

Dyke, this is clear evidence that Carter knew the property in
question belonged to his neighbor to the north.

In an effort to

cure this problem he sought to buy the adjoining property at a very
low price.

Carter's conduct in making an offer to purchase the

property is inconsistent with the position he and his witnesses
took at trial.
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In addition, Mr. Carter admitted in his trial testimony that
he never consulted a map or had his property surveyed to determine
the exact location of his boundaries. (Tr. 152)

A reasonable man

would have consulted with a map or survey prior to purchasing real
property; had he done so the discrepancy would have become apparent
immediately.

Carter should not be allowed to claim ignorance of

his boundaries to the detriment of the Hanrath Defendants.

CONCLUSION
Defendant Hanraths ask that this Court reverse the ruling of
the trial court quieting title in the Plaintiff and order that they
be allowed full possession of their property as it is legally
described on their deed.
DATED this

^Q

day of October, 1993.

GREEN & BERRY

'Ml

UAC-

JULIE V.| LUND
Attorney1 for Defendants Hanrath
P-223-91\SUMMDISP.MEM
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EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENlL/W^

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ROYDEN V. CARTER
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHIRLEY HANRATH, SHIRLEY
HANRATH REVOCABLE TRUST
and HANRATH MARITAL TRUST
UNDER WILL,

CASE NO. 89-CV-104-D

Defendants.
The above-captioned matter came on regularly before the Court for Trial the 19th
day of November, 1992, before the Honorable John R. Anderson, sitting without a jury.
Brandt H. Wall, Esq. appearing for the Plaintiff: Frederick N. Green, Esq. and Roland
Uresk, Esq. appearing for Defendant. Evidence having been adduced, argument having been
made, and the Court having taken the matter under advisement, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs immediate predecessor acquired the property in question
from Abplanalp in 1964. Visual inspection of the property at that time evidenced boundaries
on the East and West of the property to the cliffs which are located North of the Duchesne
River and North of the property.
2. The West and East boundaries were marked by a substantial and clearly visable
fence for a long time.
3. Adjoining land owners on the West and East considered the fences to be the
boundaries.
4. Plaintiff considered the fences to be the boundaries.
5. Plaintiff considered the cliffs on the North of the river to be the boundary.

6. Plaintiff, in fact, used the land in a notorious way for the entire time of ownership
to the present date.
7. The fences were attached to the cliffs; the cliffs were barriers and monuments.
8. Plaintiffs predecessor had constructed improvements on the disputed area South
of the river.
9. Hanrath's predecessor purchased her property without a visual inspection in 1961.
10. Visual inspection would have shown boundary enclosures.
11. Defendant, Hanrath, gains no more right to the property boundary than her
predecessor had.
The elements as set forth in Staker v. Ainsworth. 785 P2d 417 ( Utah 1990) are set
forth as follows:
(1) Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by monuments, fences, or
buildings;
(2) Acquiescence in the line as the boundary;
(3) For a long period of time and;
(4) By adjoining land owners.
Defendants Hanrath concede that the thiid and fourth elements of the boundary by
acquiescence have been met.
From the findings of the Court, it is clear that the East and West fence lines have
been in existence for a long period of time and were definitely marked and stable. The
Court in its findings also determines that the cliffs are valid monuments and are attached
geometrically to encompass the boundary of the property by the fence lines that were in fact
attached to the cliffs that had extended across the river on both the West and the East
boundaries of the property.
The Court further concludes that there was actual acquiescence in the line and the
geometric boundary of the property by Hanrath's predecessors.
The language in Lane v. Walker. 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P2d 1199 (1973) is
appropriate.
-2-

20 *

"....To this we say that the test to establish the boundary by 'acquiescence'
necessarily need not be based on mutual 'intent'. 'Intent' is not synonymous with
'acquiescence' in these cases. 'Acquiescence' is more nearly synonymous with 'indolence,'
or 'consent by silence,' -or a knowledge that a fence or other monuments appears to be a
boundary, -but that no one did anything about it for 48 years
"
In the present case, the Shraders had a duty to visually inspect what was there to be
seen. The Court concludes that their failure to do so carries imputed acquiescence from their
predecessors who could have seen the fences and the total enclosure to the cliffs North of the
river. In fact, Shraders did notice livestock "about" on their one-time visual inspection of
the property, but they were "indolent" about determining the boundary.
Based upon the above and foregoing, the Court will authorize the entry of Judgment
for the Plaintiff quieting title to the boundaries that are enclosed with the fence lines to the
cliffs as against the Defendant, Hanrath, and costs. No Attorney fees are awarded.
The Court further grants trespass damages in favor of O.B. Carter, et al, the crossclaimants, and awards damages in the sum of $1.00. No Attorney fees are awarded. The
Court further concludes no cause of action on the Hanrath claim against O.B. Carter for
trespass.
Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment.

K
V
DATED this ^

day of November, 1992.
BYT

JOHN R. ANDERSON,
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

-3»•

2U-j"

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the Jofy^ day of November, 1992, true and correct copies
of the Memorandum Decision were mailed, postage prepaid, to Mr. Brandt H. Wall,
Attorney for Plaintiff, at Suite 800 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, Mr. Roland
Uresk, Attorney for Defendant, at 47 North 200 East, Roosevelt, UT 84066, and to Mr.
Frederick N. Green, Attorney for Defendants, at 528 Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange
Place, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.

Cheryl Wefiks/Deputy Clerk

£*k»

BRANT H. WALL, NO. 3364
WALL & WALL, a.p.c.
Attorney for Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant
Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-8220
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROYDEN V. CARTER,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

Case No. 89-CV-104-D

SHIRLEY HANRATH and MAGDALENE
STEVENS,

Judge:

John R. Anderson

Defendants.

The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the
Bench, the Honorable John R. Anderson presiding, on November 19,
1992, and was concluded on said date.

By prior Order of this

Court, based on stipulation of counsel, Magdalene Stevens was
substituted for Shirley Hanrath and Shirley Hanrath Revocable Trust
and Hanrath Marital Trust Under Will, as Defendant.

The parties

waived final argument and jointly stipulated that the Court, at its
discretion, could view the premises at a time convenient to the
Court.

The Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant, O.B. Carter, were

present and said Plaintiff and Cross Defendants were represented by
their counsel, Brant H. Wall.

The Defendant, Shirley Hanrath was

present and the Defendants Shirley Hanrath and Magdalene Stevens
were represented by their counsel, Frederick N. Green and Ronald
ALL (A P C )
"YS AT LAW

Ursek.

Witnesses were duly sworn and testified, evidence was

introduced, Stipulations were received and the Court, having duly
considered the same and being fully advised in the premises and
having viewed the premises, hereby enters its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Plaintiff and Cross-Defendants, Carter, were and are,
at all times material, residents of the State of Utah and the said
Defendants identified as Hanrath and Stevens are residents of the
State of Utah and this Court has jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject mater of this action.
2.

On or about May, 1964, the Plaintiff together with his

brother Osborne B. Carter, entered into a contract with one Pete F.
Abplanalp and Bessie E. Abplanalp to purchase parcels of real
property situate in Duchesne County, State of Utah and described as
follows:
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 6 WEST, U.S.M. Section

20: North half Northeast quarter. Section 19:
Southeast quarter and Southwest quarter.
Together with all improvements, appurtenances
and water rights thereto belonging.
Excepting and reserving one half of all oil,
gas and other minerals. Expressly conveying
unto grantees one half of all oil, gas and
other minerals hereunder.
3.

The said contract was thereafter paid in full, and title

to the premises was transferred by Warranty Deed dated May 18, 1964
to the Plaintiff and Osborne B. Carter.
WALL (A P C )
INEYS AT LAW

4. On or about the 6th day of August, 1969, Osborne B. Carter
quitclaimed his interest in the above described property to the
Plaintiff herein who is the owner of said lands.
5. That with reference to that portion of the land identified
as the North one-half of the Northeast quarter, Section 20,
Township 2 South, Range 6 West, U.S.M., the said Pete F. Abplanalp
and Bessie E. Abplanalp, his wife, and their predecessors in
interest had for many years prior to 19 64, exclusively occupied,
farmed, possessed and improved the same together with an area of
land lying immediately north thereof which extended to the base of
ledges and cliffs located north of the Duchesne River, such
additional

parcel being

referred to herein as the

"disputed

parcel". The exact description of said parcel to be ascertained by
survey.
6. At the time Plaintiff "acquired said property from the said
Abplanalps, he made inquiry of

said Abplanalps

and personal

inspection of the property to determine the general boundaries
thereof, and ascertained

therefrom that old fence boundaries

existed on the east and west lines of said property extending from
the first tier of cliffs north of the Duchesne River, south to the
north line of a state and public highway which included the area in
dispute as well as the area described by deed in Section 20
aforesaid.
7.

The west and east boundaries of said property are marked

by substantial and clearly visible old fences which have existed
. WALL (A P C )
WEYS AT LAW
BOSTON BUILDING
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for at least 50 years and continue to exist to the present time,
and Plaintiff and his predecessors have considered the fences and
the cliffs north of the Duchesne River to be the boundaries of said i
property, and have used said land in a notorious way for the entire >
time of ownership to the present.
8.

|
I

That at the time the property was acquired by the i

Plaintiff, no survey was obtained

or otherwise

conducted

to |

ascertain the location of the true boundaries nor has the Plaintiff j
caused a survey to be conducted at any time since the acquisition '
of said property, and at all times, Plaintiff has relied upon the |
monuments consisting of old established fence lines and the cliffs |
immediately north of the Duchesne River as constituting the east,
west and north boundaries of the property acquired, and Plaintiff !
!

did not know the exact location of the true boundaries as described J
I
by Deed.
9.

|
That the abutting landowners on the east, west and north j

side of the disputed tract of land have, for a period in excess of |
50 years prior to the claims asserted by Defendants herein,
acquiesced in the old established fence lines and the ledges and J
cliffs

immediately

north of the Duchesne River as the true '

boundaries of their respective properties.

'

10. Plaintiff and his predecessors in interest have, since at j
least 1920 to the present date, used, occupied, improved and farmed .
the property which is in dispute, for various types of agricultural '
!

pursuit

including

the raising

of

livestock, cultivation
<^L J

and
i

harvesting of crops, construction and maintenance of improvements
consisting of a barn, stack yard and fences.
11.

That the disputed tract lies contiguous to the north

boundary of the premises conveyed to the Carters as described in
paragraph 2 hereinabove, and with the exception of some irregular
"cross fencing" to facilitate and manage the pasturing of livestock
by the Carters and their predecessors in interest, no barrier has
existed between the disputed tract and the parcel conveyed to
Carters aforesaid.
12.

The east and west fences of the disputed tract have, for

at least 50 years, been attached to the first tier of cliffs
located immediately north of the Duchesne River and said cliffs
were and are natural monuments and barriers, and are attached
geometrically to encompass the boundary of the property by the
fence lines that were in fact attached to the cliffs that had
extended across the river on both the east and west boundaries of
the property, thus clearly delineating the claim of ownership and
the boundaries of the respective adjoining properties.
13.

The Plaintiff's predecessors in interest constructed a

barn, stack yard and related improvements in the area south of the
Duchesne

River

and

within

the

area

in

dispute,

and

said

improvements have existed thereon and have been exclusively used by
the Carters and their predecessors for a long period of time to the
present date.
14.

The old fence lines across the Duchesne River have
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routinely been damaged or destroyed by high-water and/or floods
occurring in the spring of each year, and said fence lines have
typically

been

replaced

and/or

repaired

following

each

such j

occurrence by Plaintiff and his predecessors.
15.

That the Defendant, Shirley Hanrath, prior to 1986, had

occasion to be upon the lands and premises immediately west of the
disputed parcel and on these occasions there existed a well defined
and established old fence line which separated the disputed tract
and the lands immediately south thereof from the parcel of land
lying adjacent and west thereof and the said Shirley Hanrath knew
that the Plaintiff was in possession of, farming and otherwise
occupying the disputed area oj: land in a manner consistent with a
claim of ownership.
16. Hanrathfs predecessor in interest, Shrader, acquired the
property in dispute and other land from one A. Fletcher Harris
et.ux., without a visual inspection, in approximately 1961.

A

visual inspection at that time would have disclosed the boundary
enclosures and the use being made of the disputed premises,
including the raising and pasturing of livestock, cultivation and
harvesting of crops, existing stack yard and barn, maintenance of
boundary fences and open notorious use of said premises as an
integral part of the total tract possessed by Carter and/or his
predecessors in interest, also, the fact that the ledges north of
the Duchesne River constituted a natural boundary and monument
consistent with a general community acquiescence and recognition.
& WALL (A P C )
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17.

The said Shraders, who were predecessors in interest of

the Defendants Hanrath and Stevens, visited the premises during
1974 or 1975 and at that time noticed livestock

"about" the

property which is the subject of dispute in this litigation, and
were indolent in making any determination of the boundaries of the
property in dispute and at no time challenged, contested or
otherwise objected to the boundaries and use as established on the
disputed tract, and had they inspected said premises, they would
have seen the fences and the total enclosure by the cliffs and
ledges north of the river as natural boundaries.
18.

The land acquired by Shrader in 19 61, and subsequently

sold to Hanrath in 1986, consisted of the Southeast quarter of
Section

17 Township

2 South, Range

6 West U.S.M.,

and was

contiguous to the north line of the property described in the deed
to Carter. The vast majority'of the land in Section 17 was located
on a bench or plateau north of the Duchesne River. At the time of
the acquisition of said property, the said Shraders knew that the
portion which is in dispute in this case was physically land-locked
and that no access existed thereto by virtue of the cliffs and
ledges lying between the Duchesne River and the remainder of said
lands.
19.

For a period in excess of 50 years, the Defendants1

predecessors in interest and the abutting property owners of the
lands

and

premises

claimed

and

occupied

by

Carter

and

his

predecessors in interest, which includes the area in dispute, have

8
acquiesced in the ledges and cliffs lying immediately north of the
Duchesne River as being the geometric boundary between said
respective ownerships; that in addition thereto, the said parties
have known of the existence of old established fence lines which
enclosed the east and west side of the disputed tract as boundaries
of the area in dispute as claimed by Plaintiff and acquiesced
therein as constituting boundaries of the disputed tract.
20.

Hanraths caused surveys of the disputed premises to be

conducted in 1986, 1988 and 1989 which revealed a discrepancy
between the record ownership and "as occupied" land.

The prior

owners of the lands lying north, west and east of the disputed
tracts have historically, for a period of more than 50 years,
recognized the natural boundaries and monuments aforesaid to be and
constitute

the true boundaries of the properties

claimed by

Plaintiff, and the predecessors in interest of the Defendants
Hanrath and Stevens knew that the Plaintiff or his predecessors in
interest were asserting ownership to the premises enclosed within
the monuments aforesaid and remained silent and took no action to
contest or object to the fence lines and cliffs which plainly
marked the claimed ownership of the disputed area by Carter and his
predecessors.
21.

Defendants Hanrath and Stevens gain no more right to the

property boundary than their predecessors had.
•3-2-;—The el-emsnts set forHinbfr-lSl^c^^
-4-9-9^-j—are—apprapcr; and DefenddiiLs have cunceded—the
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23.

landowner

6^4-ef. ~jpf

Defendant Hanrath has trespassed upon the lands and

premises owned by the Plaintiff Carter during 1986, 1988 and 1989
without just cause or right and by reason thereof the CrossDefendants Carter have sustained damages in the sum of $1.00 and
are entitled to Judgment against the Defendant Hanrath for such
amount.
24.

The Cross-Claimants, O.B. Carter and Randy Carter have

not trespassed upon the lands and premises of Defendants Hanrath
and Stevens and said Defendants have sustained no damages or loss
for reasons asserted.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following Conclusions of Law:
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the

subject matter of this action.
2. Boundary by acquiescence necessarily need not be based on
mutual

intent.

Intent is not synonymous with acquiescence.

Acquiescence in this case arises, in part, from indolence and/or
consent by silence for a period of excess of 50 years.
3.

The

Shraders, who were Defendants1

predecessors in

interest, had a duty to visually inspect what was there to be seen,
and their failure to do so carries imputed acquiescence from their
& WALL (A P C )
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predecessors who could have seen the fences and the total enclosure
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to the cliffs north of the river.
4.

The East and West fence lines have been in existence for

a long period of time, more than 50 years, and were definitely
marked and stable; also, the cliffs immediately north of the
Duchesne River are valid monuments and are attached geometrically
to encompass the boundary of the property in dispute by the fence
lines that were in fact attached to the cliffs that had extended
across the river on both the west and east boundaries of the
property.
5.
question

There was actual acquiescence in the north line in
and

the geometric boundary

of the property

by the

predecessors in interest of the Defendants Hanrath and Stevens and
said Defendants gain no more right to the property than their
predecessors had.
6.

Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree quieting title to the

property whose boundaries are enclosed with fences to the cliffs
and along said cliffs (disputed tract) as against the Defendants
Shirley Hanrath and Magdalene Stevens and all parties claiming by,
through or under them. Said premises to be delineated by survey to
be conducted by Plaintiff at no cost to Defendants, and the said
Hanrath and Stevens and all parties claiming by, through or under
them, are hereby debarred, restrained and enjoined from asserting
any right, title or interest in said premises.
7.

The Cross-claims asserted by the Defendants Hanrath and

Stevens against Cross-Defendants O.B. Carter and Randy Carter for
WALL (A P C )
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trespass are hereby dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action.
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8. The Cross-Defendants, O.B. Carter and Randy Carter, CrossClaimants, are entitled to Judgment against the Defendant Hanrath
for trespass, in the sum of $1.00.
9.
10.

No attorneys fees are awarded to either party.
Plaintiff is entitled to costs incurred herein in the

amount of $
DATED this

I fifr day of February, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

1STRICT COURT JUDGE
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BRANT H. WALL, NO. 3364
WALL & WALL, a.p.c.
Attorney for Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant
Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-8220
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROYDEN V. CARTER,

;
JUDGMENT AND DECREE

Plaintiff,

:
:1

vs.

Case No. 89-CV-104-D

SHIRLEY HANRATH and MAGDALENE ; Honorable John R. Anderson
STEVENS
: District Court Judge
Defendants.

;

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the
bench, the Honorable John R. Anderson, presiding on November 19,
1992 and was concluded on said date. By prior Order of this Court,
based on Stipulation of counsel, Magdalene Stevens was substituted
for Shirley Hanrath and Shirley Hanrath Revocable trust and Hanrath
Marital Trust Under Will, as Defendant.

The parties waived final

argument and jointly stipulated that the Court, at its discretion,
could view the premises at a time convenient to the Court.

The

Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant, O.B. Carter, were present and said
Plaintiff and Cross-Defendants were represented by their counsel,
Brant H. Wall.

The Defendant Shirley Hanrath, hereinafter called

Hanrath, was present and the Defendants Hanrath and Stevens were
represented by their counsel, Frederick N. Green and Ronald Ursek.

25'.

Witnesses were duly sworn and testified, evidence was introduced,
Stipulations were received and the Court, having duly considered
the same and being fully advised in the premises and having entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, Now Therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:

1.

The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the

subject matter of this action.
2.

The cliffs immediately north of the Duchesne River are

valid monuments and are attached geometrically to encompass the
north boundary of the property in dispute by the fence lines that
were in fact attached to the cliffs that had extended across the
river on both the west and east boundaries of the property.
5. There was actual acquiescence in the line in question and
the geometric boundary of the property by the predecessors in
interest of the Defendants Hanrath and Stevens and said Defendants
gain no more right to the property than their predecessors had.
6. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment and Decree quieting title to
the property hereinafter described against the Defendants Shirley
Hanrath and Magdalene Stevens and all parties claiming by, through
or under them, to-wit:
That certain tract of land situate in the
Southeast quarter of Section 17, Township 2
South, Range 6 West, U.S.M., bounded on the
south by the north line of the Northeast
quarter of Section 20, Township 2 South, Range
6 West, U.S.M.; bounded on the north by the
first tier of cliffs and ledges immediately
north of the Duchesne River; and bounded on
the east and west by old established fence
, WALL (A P C )
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lines anchored to said cliffs and ledges and
extending southerly to the north line of said
Section 20.
The said Defendants and all parties claiming by, through or
under them are hereby debarred, restrained and enjoined from
asserting any right, title or interest in said premises.
The Plaintiff shall cause an accurate survey to be conducted
to describe the aforesaid parcel, at no cost to the Defendants and
said description shall be substituted for the general description \
j
hereinabove set forth pursuant to appropriate Motion and further <
i
i

Order of this Court.
7.

The Cross-claims asserted by the Defendants Hanrath and

Stevens against Cross-Defendants O.B. Carter and Randy Carter for
trespass are hereby dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action.
8. The Cross-Defendants, O.B. Carter and Randy Carter, CrossClaimants, are awarded Judgment against the Defendant Hanrath for
trespass, in the sum of $1.00.
9.
10.

No attorneys fees are awarded to either party.
Plaintiff is awarded Judgment for costs incurred herein

in the amount of $

.

DATED this / 6 T ^ day of -February, 1993.
BY TH
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